Corruption in Bangladesh: An Analytical Framework

- Munir Zaman

Corruption occurs at the interface of public and private sector relations and is understood to mean an abuse of public authority for private benefit, be it acquisition of power or of profit. State authority thus plays a decisive role in the presence or absence of corruption.

It is a common knowledge among the members of the older generation in Bangladesh that corruption at high levels of political authorities as well as bureaucracy was limited or virtually inexistent. What went wrong with the exercise of state authority since then?

A new separate and independent state had come into being. The event was preceded by war, blood letting, and movement of a large body of people from one place to another in search of safety. State authority had completely broken down. What was left of it was directed to the exercise of brute force with a corresponding popular resistance to it.
The task for the new state was to re-establish its authority to permit the functioning of an orderly society. However, instead of consolidating the various state institutions badly dented during the liberation struggle, the state proceeded to enlarge its functional responsibilities, acquiring wider command over resources through measures like nationalization of industries, banks and insurance companies, in addition to direct management of industries, business houses and other properties left by the Pakistanis. The limited management capacity related to the expanded area of responsibility created condition for waste and leakage in the use of resources. People with greedy eyes did not fail to see the opportunities for private gains so offered.
Meanwhile, the institutional capacity for governance had steadily declined. All recruitments to higher bureaucracy which had a tradition of political neutrality, had stopped. In the late seventies, a merit based higher civil service was abolished in the name of administrative reform and replaced by elements drawn from heterogeneous sources. The reform ignored the need for incentive pay, motivation and guaranteeing a politically neutral work environment for the civil service. In the meandering course of a changeable political situation- a parliamentary system, then a one party rule followed by military coup, presidential system, direct army takeover, autocratic rule and then a factious parliamentary system- obviously needed a corps of highly trained politically neutral civil servants who would tender unbiased advice to the political leaders on policy matters and carry on the task of its implementation in accordance with the rules and laws of the land. But this was not to be.

In a fluid situation, when the laws have been inadequately enforced, acquisition of wealth today becomes for many and insurance of any misfortune tomorrow. For a political leader, this line of reasoning has a special relevance. Samuel Huntington observed that when political power is threatened, as may happen to a leader losing support from important quarters, a politician may use his ill-gotten wealth to buy back support. [1] The emergence of an independent state itself engendered a heightened level of expectations about wider economic opportunities and political participation. While the ill- advised policy of nationalization put a serious restriction to the pursuit of legitimate business activities, the political participation broadened and advanced, as evidenced by the appearances of many new faces in politics.

Arguing from the other end, a World Bank paper observes that “when political participation advances more rapidly than political institutionalization, political system can become unstable and thus fall a prey to corruption.” At an operational level political institutionalization will mean respect for rules, functional autonomy and absence of obstacles to electoral accountability of the political leaders [2]. The personality factor of the leaders overshadowing the political parties, and the stiff refusal to consider any reform agenda even at the risk of splitting a party or further erosion of credibility point to the difficulties of the institutionalization of the political system.

Corruption in the country is not restricted to higher level of political authority and decision makers, i.e. Head of the Government, Ministers and others holding positions of authority, but exist also at a lower level. Low level corruption is committed routinely by petty officials. The citizens may experience it every now and then at public offices. Public offices established to promote public services. Although committed at a lower level, it may not be proper to regard them as cases of petty corruption, for the total volume of transactions when added up, may be substantial. However, high level corruption is for more damaging in its impact on the society. As the public resources are plundered at will, the interest of the state can be bought or sold making the state substantially dysfunctional.

If high level corruption in Bangladesh owed its origin to prolonged political instability caused by a mismatch between heightened expectations about economic and political opportunities on one hand and institutional deficiencies on the other, then it probably represents no more than a passing phase. In that event, it will decline as the nation, perhaps through a few more tortuous experiments, builds up a durable structure of a participatory polity ensuring comprehensive accountability of the political authority to the electorate. However, fuller political institutionalization obviously will take time. Here, we are dealing with an impatient nation.

1. Huntington (1968); quoted in “research on corruption- study initiated by NORAD (December, 2000) P.12
2. Philip Keefer: “clientalism, credibility and policy choices of young democracies; Development Research Group” (September 2005) P.6

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